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Abstract
Since the late 1970s, technological developments, especially in communications 
and transportation, have contributed to growth of  new modes of  social interaction 
and, at the same time, to the strengthening of  social bonds in geographically 
dispersed social groups and communities in Yogyakarta. Increased educational 
opportunities and especially the development of  the Islamic university system 
have contributed to the development of  a Muslim middle class and with it a 
Muslim consumer culture. There has also been a significant shift in the ways in 
which relationships between culture (kebudayaan) and religion (agama) are 
conceptualised. Elements of  Javanese Muslim tradition including prayer meals 
(slametan) that were formerly called agama are now more commonly referred 
to as kebudayaan. This shift reflects and has contributed to the diminution 
of  sectarian conflict. This cultural strategy is not always successful. It does, 
however, provide a basis for proactive measures to counter sectarian violence. 
This is evident in “cultural” festivals supported by the kraton (palace) in 
response to attacks on cultural performance events by exclusivist religious groups.
[Sejak dekade 1970an, kemajuan teknologi, utamanya dalam komunikasi 
dan transportasi, telah mengubah cara interaksi sosial masyarakat Yogyakarta 
dan, pada saat yang sama, semakin memperkokoh ikatan antar kelompok 
sosial. Semakin meningkatnya kesempatan belajar [sekolah], utamanya 
dengan berdirinya Universitas Islam, terbukti mendorong terciptanya 
kalangan ‘Muslim kelas menengah’ sekaligus konsumerisme yang melekat 
pada kalangan tersebut. Selain itu, terjadi pula perubahan konsep dalam 
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menilai agama dan kebudayaan. Beberapa bentuk tradisi Islam Jawa, seperti 
slametan, yang dulunya dinilai sebagai ritual agama, saat ini hanya disebut 
sebagai kebudayaan. Perubahan ini menggambarkan dan bahkan berperan 
dalam meminimalisir konflik sektarian, seperti terlihat jelas dalam acara 
festival “budaya” yang diadakan kraton sebagai respon terhadap pembubaran 
pementasan budaya oleh kalangan Muslim ekslusif.]
Keywords: social change, communication, transportation, education, 
kebudayaan, agama, Yogyakarta
A. Introduction
I first came to Yogyakarta in 1979 and have been researching and 
writing about Islam and Javanese culture here ever since. There have 
been many changes in Yogyakarta and in Indonesia more generally 
and there is much that remains as it was thirty some years ago. Today 
I do not want to indulge in personal reflections on continuity and 
change, reminisce nostalgically about the “good old days” or revel in 
the glories of  developmentalism. I think that our purposes are served 
better by exploring, however briefly, the social and cultural dynamics 
that transformed Indonesia during a period of  rapid social change. In 
this respect my comments are in the same spirit, if  not nearly the same 
length or depth as those Selo Soemardjan made in his now classic, Social 
Changes in Yogyakarta about an equally significant period in Yogyanese 
and Indonesian history.1
Some of  the most basic material and social changes that have 
taken place over the past thirty years are in the areas of  communication, 
transportation and education. The rapid expansion of  the middle class 
is unquestionably the most significant social change to take place during 
this period. These are not difficult to observe or to quantify. They are 
no less important for being obvious. There are also changes that cannot 
be attributed to economic and technological developments alone. 
Many of  these are more difficult to locate because they are shifts in 
cultural and religious orientations that can be observed only indirectly. 
In assessing social, cultural and religious change in Yogyakarta over the 
1 S. Soemarjan, Social Changes in Yogyakarta (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1962).
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past three decades it is essential to be cognizant of  the significance of  
the of  the authoritarian, developmentalist “New Order” (1965-1998) 
and the dramatic change in the social, communications and religious 
environments that followed from its sudden and dramatic collapse in the 
“Reformasi” of  1998.2 What follows are tentative observations that might 
better be phrased as research questions. Some of  these are explored in 
my recent book, Java, Indonesia and Islam.3 Others are observations and 
reflections on how Yogyakarta, Java and Indonesia have changed since 
the day that I first stepped off  the train at Stasiun Tugu in January of  1979.
B. Communications and Transportation
In the late 1970s inter-personal communication was face to face to 
a much greater extent than it is today. Very few people have telephones 
or televisions. One could communicate with friends or family outside the 
city or by post or when there were urgent needs, such as a death in the 
family, by telegraph. It sometimes took several hours to send a telegram 
because it could only be done by standing in line at the post office. In the 
“old days” one sent a message across town by writing a note and giving 
it to a becak driver to deliver. Today, we communicate instantly across the 
city, the country and the world by SMS, for less that we paid the becak 
driver (in constant Rupiah). The changes have been so extensive that some 
of  my students at both Gadjah Mada University (UGM) and the State 
Islamic University of  Sunan Kalijaga (UINSK) are shocked to learn that 
I can remember times when there were no hand-phones, or Facebook or 
ATMs. The fact that the electronic communications revolution emerged 
in Yogya at approximately the same rate it has in the “developed” world 
is an indicator of  the degree to which globalisation has diminished the 
gap between rich and poor countries. I should add here that electronic 
communication, especially e-mail, has revolutionised research. Thirty 
years ago anthropological fieldwork was generally conducted in isolation. 
Today it is possible to maintain communication with colleagues across 
the world, share ideas and information even from villages that would 
2 For an extended discussion of  the ways in which the New Order regime 
attempted to guide the course of  Indonesia’s economic, political and cultural 
development see: J. Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993). 
3 Mark Woodward, Java, Indonesia and Islam (Heildelberg etc.: Springer, 2010).
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have formerly been considered remote and isolated thirty years ago. 
The implications for the ways in which these developments influence 
the research process have yet to be explored in the theoretical and 
methodological literature.
The rapid expansion of  the translation and publication sectors has 
also contributed to the amounts of  information available to Indonesian 
consumers. In the late 1970s the Gunung Agung near the southwest 
corner of  the Tugu was the only bookstore of  any size in Yogyakarta and 
its offerings were limited. Today people can choose from vast range of  
books by Indonesian, Western and Middle Eastern authors. Books are, 
of  course, not the only media through which ideas are communicated. 
In the late 1970s audiotapes were already an important medium for the 
dissemination of  ideas. Non-print media have expanded enormously. 
Audiotape remains a significant medium and has been augmented by 
video, CD and access to information via the internet. These media, at 
least as much as print materials, have created an increasingly globally 
integrated information environment. It is important to emphasise that 
these media are culturally, religiously and politically neutral. In contrast 
to what Marshall McLuhan observed, the medium is not the message. 
The content of  the Indonesian language Islam web, for example, mirrors 
that of  other modes of  discourse almost exactly.4
The explosion of  the motorised transport system had a similarly 
significant impact on social networks. In the 1970s Yogyakarta was still a 
city of  bicycles. Cars and motorcycles were very rare. There were perhaps 
a dozen taxis in the city most of  which were parked at the railway station 
much of  the time. Inter city transport was primarily by train or bus. Horse 
and bullock carts were common. There were very limited flights from 
Adisutjipto, which at that time was not an international airport. Today 
Air Asia boasts the “Everyone can fly.” That is not actually true, but the 
number of  air passengers is many times what it was thirty years ago. 
What in English are called motorcycles were formerly called sepeda-motor 
or motorised bicycles and now are simply “motor.” This linguistic change 
4 H. Davulcu, S. Ahmed, S. Gokalp, H. Temkit, T. Taylor, M. Woodward, A. 
Amin, “Analyzing Sentiment Markers Describing Radical and Counter-Radical Elements 
in Online News,”  Proceedings of  the 2nd IEEE International Conference on Social 
Computing (SocialCom-10), Symposium on Social Intelligence and Networking (SIN-10), 
Minneapolis, MN, August 2010, pp. 335-340.
Reflections on Java and Islam 1979-2010
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2011 M/1432 H 285
reflects the normalisation of  motorised transport.
Technological development and the increasing availability of  
transport and communication have both broaden social networks and 
vastly increased the amount of  information that can flow through them. 
Facebook is an obvious example because it enables very large networks 
of  “friends” some to share almost unlimited amounts of  information. 
My hypothesis is, however, that the technological developments that 
have had the greatest impact are hand phones and “motor” because they 
are inexpensive and very common. They make it easier for dispersed 
communities, especially people who have migrated from rural to urban 
areas, and the increasing numbers who now work overseas to remain in 
contact with friends and families. They also facilitate the development 
and expansion of  networks based on cultural and religious affinities.
C. Education
Changes in education are equally apparent. This is especially true of  
higher education. In the early decades of  post-coloniality Indonesia made 
enormous progress in expanding basic literacy. There has been a natural 
expansion of  secondary and post-secondary education. These reflect 
a developing economy’s requirement for an increasingly sophisticated 
labour force. Two educational developments are especially significant. 
These are the development of  the Islamic Universities and the more recent 
emergence of  extremely expensive secular and religious “international 
class” primary and secondary schools. Ironically these serve opposite 
ends of  the economic spectrum. Islamic Universities offer educational 
opportunities to young people from rural, less developed communities. 
“International class” schools target the bureaucratic and capitalist elite. 
The emergence of  the Islamic Universities may in the long term broaden 
the cultural and religious base of  the middle class. The development of  
Islamic Universities is can also be seen as an outgrowth in changes in 
pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding schools). Over the past thirty years 
the number of  these schools that teach “secular” subjects in addition 
to the traditional religious curriculum has increased significantly.5 This 
5 On the pesantren tradition see A. Djajadiningrat, “Reminiscences about Life 
in a Pesantren,” in C. Penders (ed. and trans.), Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism 
and Nationalism, 1830–1942 (Saint Lucia: University of  Queensland Press, 1977), pp. 
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has created a large cadre of  young people from conservative Muslim 
backgrounds prepared for university study. The Islamic Universities are 
making important contributions not just to education in religious and 
secular subjects but also the expansion of  the Muslim middle class. The 
emergence of  elitist education may have nearly opposite sociological 
consequences if  it establishes elite education, beyond the reach of  all 
but a tiny minority, as a “gate keeper” for social advancement as it is in 
the United Kingdom and to a slightly lesser degree in the United States. 
D. Categorical Shifts: Agama (Religion) and Kebudayaan (Culture)
Technological change and development in education are not 
difficult to document. They are what sociologist Emile Durkheim 
called “social facts.”6 Assessing their social and cultural significance 
is a more problematic endeavour. This is an interpretive process that 
requires attention to the role of  the state in shaping social and economic 
change. The cultural and religious landscapes and understandings of  
the relationship between culture and religion have shifted in opposite 
directions simultaneously in responses to technological change, enhanced 
communication and patterns of  state power over the past three decades. 
The cultural-religious polarisation characteristic of  the 1960s and 1970s 
has decreased significantly. Organised groups, such as Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) and Muhammadiyah and broader religious communities who were 
once overtly hostile have gradually come to see themselves as being 
248–52; Z. Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of  the Kyai in the Maintenance of  
Traditional Islam in Java (Tempe: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian 
Studies Monograph Series, 1999); and S. Yunanto et al., Islamic Education in South and 
South East Asia: Diversity, Problems and Strategy (Jakarta: RIDEP Institute, 2005). On the 
modernisation of  the pesantren tradition see: Ronald Lukens-Bull, A Peaceful Jihad. 
Negotiating Identity and Modernity in Muslim Java (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 
and “Round Table on Pesantren Tradition,” in M. Pye et al. (eds.), Religious Harmony: 
Problems, Practice, and Education (Berlin: De Gruyer, 2006). On Muhammadiyah schools 
see: A. Azra, D. Afrianty, and R. Hefner, “Pesantren and Madrasa: Muslim Schools 
and National Deals in Indonesia,” in R. Hefner and M. Zamman, Schooling Islam: the 
Culture and Politics of  Modern Muslim Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007), p. 172-198.
6 On the Durkheimian concept of  social facts see M. Gilbert, On Social Facts 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 237-288, and E. Durkheim, Rules of  
Sociological Method (New York: The Free Press, 1982).
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variants on common cultural religious themes.7 There has also been 
significant “santrification” or increased concern with orthoprax Muslim 
piety among groups who were formerly indifferent or even opposed to 
it. The public display and use of  Muslim symbols, especially “Muslim” 
clothing for both women and men is also increasingly important.
In the late 1970’s the heavy hands of  colonialism and of  the 
politicide of  1965 and 1966 that brought the New Order to power were 
readily apparent in Yogyakarta. There was a much strong correspondence 
between social communities and religious orientations than there is today. 
This was in part the consequence of  colonial policies of  “divided and 
rule” and of  the political polarisation of  religion in the first two decades of  
Indonesian history. There was a tendency to emphasise difference and to 
minimise commonality. One of  the cornerstones of  Dutch colonial policy 
had been to break links between what Kumar refers to as the two poles of  
Javanese civilisation: the kraton and the mosque.8 Through both coercion 
and elite education that focused on a modern, western curriculum and 
elements of  Javanese culture that are not obviously Muslim, the Dutch 
sought to create an administrative elite that was western oriented and 
marginally committed to Islam.9 This policy was remarkably successful 
in the short run. In the late 1970s there was a noticeable educational 
divide in Yogyakarta. There were few observant Muslims, those known 
in the academic literature as santri, who were well educated in the modern 
sense. To complicate matters further there was a significant educational 
gap within the santri community because “modernist,” especially those 
associated with Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam, had a substantial 
advantage when it came to “modern” learning. Similarly few members 
of  the political elite had more than the most rudimentary knowledge 
of  orthoprax Islam. Many, perhaps most, did not fast or pray and could 
7 On NU see: G. Barton and G. Fealy (eds.), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam 
and Modernity in Indonesia (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1996).  On Muhammadiyah 
see: M. Nakamura, Over the Banyan Tree: A Study for the Muhammadiyah Movement in an 
Indonesian Town (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1983), and J. Peacock, Muslim Puritans, 
Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1978).
8 A. Kumar, ‘”Javanese Court Society and Politics in the Late Eighteenth Century: 
The Record of  a Lady Soldier. Part I: The Religious, Social, and Economic Life of  the 
Court,” Indonesia 29, 1980, pp. 1-46.
9 H. Sutherland, The Making of  a Bureaucratic Elite: The Colonial Transformation of  
the Javanese Priyayi (Canberra: The Asian Studies Association of  Australia, 1979).
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barely recite al-Fa>tih}a (the first sura of  al-Qur’an). They were ritually 
dependent upon, but socially distant from, santri ritual specialists who 
had these skills.
This bifurcation contributed to a cultural and religious divide 
between traditionalist Javanese and modernist Muslim elites because 
Muslim modernists are inclined to reject what M. C. Ricklefs calls the 
“mystic synthesis” and to have what Clifford Geertz refers to as a 
“scripturalist” religious orientation that is highly critical of  local forms 
of  Muslim culture and piety.10 Yogyakarta was an unusual, and nearly 
unique case, because the Muslim religious elite was drawn largely from 
Muhammadiyah. The political centre of  Yogya was, and to a lesser extent 
remains, the kraton. Sociological this led to a paradoxical interdependence. 
Traditional Javanese elites relied on Muhammadiyah ritual specialists to 
perform weddings, funerals, circumcisions and other life crisis rituals. 
The Grand Mosque was, and still is, the symbolic centre of  both 
Muhammadiyah and of  the Yogyakarta kraton. Because Yogya was the 
first place that I experience the life of  Muslim communities, I did not 
realise how exceptional this social and ritual system was. At that time 
some mystical organisations (aliran kepercayaan) were rejected “Islam” 
and “Muslim” as self  designations and were certain that the Indonesian 
state was recognise them as self  sufficient religions. This, of  course, did 
not happen.
Considering shifts in usages and meanings of  the terms agama and 
kebudayan helps us to understand these processes. Agama and kebudayan 
can only be roughly translated as religion and culture.11 Academic study 
of  these concepts is complicated by the fact that they figure significantly 
in Indonesian political and religious discourse. They are simultaneously 
emic (meaningful) and etic (analytic) categories. The issues are further 
10 C. Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: 
The University of  Chicago Press, 1968), M. Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of  
Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries (Norwalk, CT: East Bridge 
Books, 2006).
11 For an analysis of  the semantic of  and politics concerning the category agama 
see: S. Hidayah, Religion in the Proper Sense of  the Word: The Discourse of  Agama in Indonesia, 
unpublished MA thesis, Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies, Gadjah Mada 
University, 2007. A similar deconstruction of  the category kebudayaan could be equally 
revealing.
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complicated by the fact that Indonesian political and religious discourse 
is more heavily informed by trans-national academic discourse than is 
the case in most other countries.
In some societies “religion” is not a salient emic category, or at 
least was not until it was introduced as such in colonial or neo-colonial 
contexts. This seems to be the case in Japan and among most American 
Indian People.12 Many Japanese, for example, are convinced that they do 
not have a religion because “religion” is defined as exclusive adherence 
to a particular sectarian group.13 In the American Southwest many 
Navajo people call what non-Indian people would call their “religion” 
simply the “Navajo way” and use the term religion to refer to varieties 
of  Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and other trans-cultural religions with 
which they are familiar. In places where religion and culture are salient 
categories, and Indonesia is one of  them, their boundaries are permeable 
and shift over time.
Questions of  what is “religion” and what is “culture” may, at times, 
be bitterly contested. In the 1970s much of  what I have written about over 
the years: the slametan, kraton ritual, and traditional healing for example, 
were often referred to as “Javanese Religion” (Agama Jawa). Prior to the 
advent of  Muslim modernism, with its puritanical inclinations, in the 
early years of  the twentieth century, and among individuals untouched 
or untroubled by this development, this complex on knowledge and 
praxis was, and still is, simply “Islam.” Today the prayer meals, traditional 
medicine and palace rituals are much more commonly referred to as 
“Javanese Culture” (Kebudayaan Jawa) even though the nature of  these 
phenomena have not changed substantially, no matter what one calls 
them. This reflects the diminution of  religious polarisation over the 
past thirty years, and a strategy for avoiding it. Many proponents of  
what was formerly called Javanese Religion are now willing to accept 
the designation Javanese Culture to avoid antagonising orthoprax, and 
12 I use the term Indian rather than the more politically correct “Native 
American” because my Pima and Navajo friends in Arizona prefer to be called “Indian 
People.”
13 I would like to thank Professor James Foard of  the Department of  Religious 
Studies at Arizona State University for this observation.
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especially modernist and Islamist, Muslims.14 
The logic of  this semantic shift is that if  these practices are defined 
as being not religious they are also not heresy. This strategy does not 
always work. In October of  2008 the Islamist Front Pembela Islam/FPI 
(Front for the Defense of  Islam) attacked the headquarters of  Javanist 
kebudayaan groups they considered to be “un-Islamic.” In Yogyakarta 
they targeted the modernist mystical organisation Sapta Dharma, which, 
analytically speaking is a religious organisation but does now refer to itself  
as such. Periodic attacks against symbols of  Kebudayaan Jawa, including 
wayang (shadow play) performances have continued. In 2011 the kraton 
supported two “cultural festivals” to demonstrate support for Javanese 
culture and opposition to violence inspired by exclusivist religious 
convictions. Both were staged on the alun alun (square) in front of  the 
palace. One re-enacted “cultural performances” representative of  each of  
the kebupaten (districts) in the Province/Sultanate, including pilgrimages 
to the graves of  local saints. The other was a wayang festival that lasted for 
eleven nights and celebrated the 500th anniversary of  Sunan Kalijaga, the 
saint revered for his use of  kebudayan as a vehicle for spreading Islamic 
teachings. 
Similarly, many orthoprax Muslims have sought to describe this 
complex as “Javanese Islamic Culture” or simply “Javanese Culture” for 
similar reasons. Shifts in the boundaries between “culture” and “religion,” 
can have important consequences for understanding the dynamics 
14 A similar dynamic tension can be found in many Indonesian Christian societies. 
Ambon is a particularly striking and complex example. There is a a distinction between 
Kristen Ambon or Ambonese Christianity and Kristen Belanda or Dutch Christianity. 
Kristen Ambon includes many elements of  traditional belief  and ritual practice. Kristen 
Belanda is a more “orthodox” form of  Dutch Calvinism. Kristen Ambon is practiced 
and supported exclusively by native Ambonese. During the colonial period Dutch 
missionaries discouraged this hybrid form of  Christianity. Today Kristen Belanda is 
supported by Ambonese ministers who have studied in the Netherlands and by the large 
diaspora community most of  who migrated the Netherlands in the 1950s because of  
their support for the Dutch during the Indonesian Revolution. Ambonese Christians 
consider them to be “imperialists” or “colonialists.” This closely resembles the way in 
which many traditional Javanese Muslims think of  Islamists affiliated with Saudi Arabian 
and other Wahhabi groups. On Wahhabi colonialism see M. Woodward, “Contesting 
Wahhabi Colonialism in Yogyakarta,” COMOPS Journal: Analysis, Commentary and News 
from the World of  Strategic Communications, November, 2008, pp. 1-8.
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of  power in Javanese and Indonesian society. The Yogyakarta kraton 
now routinely refers to itself  as a “centre of  Javanese culture.”15 Here 
Kebudayan Jawa and Kebudayaaan Yogyakarta, refer not only to the fine and 
performing arts, and to things that anthropologists would typically refer 
to as culture, but also to elements of  Javanese culture that scholars would 
generally consider to be religion, and that Javanese understand as being 
highly charged with power (kesekten). These include state ceremonies, 
pilgrimages to graves and other sacred places, traditional medicine, and 
the veneration of  sacred heirlooms (pusaka) whose powers are so great 
that they can be fatal. Thus when the kraton describes itself  as a “Centre 
of  Kebudayaan” it is making very significant claims about its religious (in 
the analytic sense) legitimacy.
Many Javanese and other Indonesian intellectuals now blame 
the cultural/religious polarisation of  earlier periods of  post-colonial 
Indonesian history on the divide and rule policies of  the Dutch and the 
research of  Orientalists, Colonialist and Neo-Colonialist Anthropologists 
and Historians. Even the neo-fundamentalist journal Panjimas published 
a special issue describing the Islamic character of  aspects of  Javanese 
Culture that in the late 1970s it would have denounced in the harshest 
possible terms.16 One of  the points made in this issue was that Orientalists 
had attempted to divide Indonesians by emphasising the non-Muslim 
elements of  Javanese and other Indonesian cultures. Curiously some 
of  my own works, especially those that have appeared in Indonesian 
translation, are sometimes cited in this discourse.17 Some people now 
15 This is, of  course, a hegemonic discourse that is strongly contested by the 
neighboring court of  Surakarta, which also claims to be the center of  Javanese culture. 
The intensity with which these rival claims remain contested became clear to me in 
January of  2008 when I delivered an address at ceremonies inaugurating the Center for 
the Study of  Religion and Javanese Culture at the National Higher School of  Islamic 
Studies in Surakarta in which I spoke primarily about Yogyakarta. The audience, of  
approximately 300 found this more than a bit disturbing. Several pointed out that 
“Surakarta is the older of  the two kingdoms and the real center of  Javanese culture.” 
Both claims are contested because in Yogyakarta it is believed that Surakarta ceased 
to be a genuine kingdom when Ngajogjokarto Hadiningrat was established. It is also 
contested by Javanese living out side the territories of  both kingdoms. 
16 Panjimas vol. 1, no. 12, May 2007.
17 Throughout the issue of  Pajimas cited above and particularly in the editor’s 
introduction to most recent edition of  the Indonesian translation of  Islam in Java 
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read them as inclusivist Muslim theology. That was not my intent, but 
authors have no control over how their works are read and interpreted.
E. Concluding Remarks
The emergence of  this apparent cultural-religious convergence 
does not, however, mean that relationships between agama and kebudayaan 
have reached a point of  stable equilibrium. The lines of  conflict have 
shifted because of  the emergence of  neo-Wahhabi Islamist groups 
supported by the Saudi state and private foundations in Saudi Arabia and 
elsewhere in the Middle East who seek to replace even the most Islamic 
forms of  Javanese culture with what they consider to be the sunna or social 
practice of  the Prophet Muhammad and his close companions. They see 
themselves as proponents of  “pure” Islam. Abu Bakar Ba’aysir, who is 
perhaps Indonesia’s most prominent Islamist thinker made exactly this 
point in a Ramadan speech in 2009. He stated that he had nothing against 
Javanese culture, other than the ninety per cent of  it that is polytheism 
(shirk). To return to the subject of  communications technology, I recorded 
his remarks on my hand phone. Ba’asyir and his supporters think of  
themselves as the only genuine Muslim in Java. Many other Javanese call 
them Arab, Saudi or Wahhabi “colonialists” bent on destroying kebudayaan 
lokal (local culture). Today there are some people in Yogyakarta who 
think that to be Muslim is to mimic Arab culture, and at the same time 
there are many more who assert that one can be profoundly Javanese 
and profoundly Muslim at the same time. Part of  what this tells us is 
that the discourse concerning the definition of  agama and kebudayaan is 
an aspect of  Javanese culture and religion though which difference and 
similarity are alternatively contested and managed.
(Islam Jawa, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2006) in which the book is compared with Edward 
Said’s Orientalism for exposing the anti-Islamic biases of  Anglo-Dutch Orientalism 
and American Anthropology. In Indonesia the book is frequently read as inclusivist 
Islamic theology. Mitso Nakamura’s works are described in similar ways.
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